From a1db74209483a24c861c848b4bb79a4d945ef6fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 07:35:30 -0500 Subject: module: replace copy_module_from_fd with kernel version Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to measure/appraise signed kernel modules. The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file() security hook. This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security call. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez Cc: Rusty Russell --- kernel/module.c | 68 +++++++-------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 8358f4697c0c..955410928696 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2654,7 +2654,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) return -ENOEXEC; - err = security_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); + err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); if (err) return err; @@ -2672,63 +2672,6 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, return 0; } -/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ -static int copy_module_from_fd(int fd, struct load_info *info) -{ - struct fd f = fdget(fd); - int err; - struct kstat stat; - loff_t pos; - ssize_t bytes = 0; - - if (!f.file) - return -ENOEXEC; - - err = security_kernel_module_from_file(f.file); - if (err) - goto out; - - err = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat); - if (err) - goto out; - - if (stat.size > INT_MAX) { - err = -EFBIG; - goto out; - } - - /* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */ - if (stat.size == 0) { - err = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - - info->hdr = vmalloc(stat.size); - if (!info->hdr) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - pos = 0; - while (pos < stat.size) { - bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(info->hdr) + pos, - stat.size - pos); - if (bytes < 0) { - vfree(info->hdr); - err = bytes; - goto out; - } - if (bytes == 0) - break; - pos += bytes; - } - info->len = pos; - -out: - fdput(f); - return err; -} - static void free_copy(struct load_info *info) { vfree(info->hdr); @@ -3589,8 +3532,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod, SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags) { - int err; struct load_info info = { }; + loff_t size; + void *hdr; + int err; err = may_init_module(); if (err) @@ -3602,9 +3547,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags) |MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC)) return -EINVAL; - err = copy_module_from_fd(fd, &info); + err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX, + READING_MODULE); if (err) return err; + info.hdr = hdr; + info.len = size; return load_module(&info, uargs, flags); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b804defe4297157a9ff45863769efe9a01953398 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 20:59:14 -0500 Subject: kexec: replace call to copy_file_from_fd() with kernel version Replace copy_file_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd(). Two new identifiers named READING_KEXEC_IMAGE and READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS are defined for measuring, appraising or auditing the kexec image and initramfs. Changelog v3: - return -EBADF, not -ENOEXEC - identifier change - split patch, moving copy_file_from_fd() to a separate patch - split patch, moving IMA changes to a separate patch v0: - use kstat file size type loff_t, not size_t - Calculate the file hash from the in memory buffer - Dave Young Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez Cc: Eric Biederman Acked-by: Dave Young --- include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 73 +++++++---------------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index fb08b668c37a..52567252288e 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2579,6 +2579,8 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int); enum kernel_read_file_id { READING_FIRMWARE = 1, READING_MODULE, + READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, + READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, READING_MAX_ID }; diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index 007b791f676d..b696c3f3708f 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -33,65 +34,6 @@ size_t __weak kexec_purgatory_size = 0; static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image); -static int copy_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, unsigned long *buf_len) -{ - struct fd f = fdget(fd); - int ret; - struct kstat stat; - loff_t pos; - ssize_t bytes = 0; - - if (!f.file) - return -EBADF; - - ret = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat); - if (ret) - goto out; - - if (stat.size > INT_MAX) { - ret = -EFBIG; - goto out; - } - - /* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */ - if (stat.size == 0) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - - *buf = vmalloc(stat.size); - if (!*buf) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - pos = 0; - while (pos < stat.size) { - bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos, - stat.size - pos); - if (bytes < 0) { - vfree(*buf); - ret = bytes; - goto out; - } - - if (bytes == 0) - break; - pos += bytes; - } - - if (pos != stat.size) { - ret = -EBADF; - vfree(*buf); - goto out; - } - - *buf_len = pos; -out: - fdput(f); - return ret; -} - /* Architectures can provide this probe function */ int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len) @@ -182,16 +124,17 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, { int ret = 0; void *ldata; + loff_t size; - ret = copy_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf, - &image->kernel_buf_len); + ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf, + &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE); if (ret) return ret; + image->kernel_buf_len = size; /* Call arch image probe handlers */ ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf, image->kernel_buf_len); - if (ret) goto out; @@ -206,10 +149,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, #endif /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */ if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) { - ret = copy_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf, - &image->initrd_buf_len); + ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf, + &size, INT_MAX, + READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS); if (ret) goto out; + image->initrd_buf_len = size; } if (cmdline_len) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From ede5147d515694e012cd958ec874b9daf8a65fec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 14:37:53 +0000 Subject: Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64() Handle the following ISO 8601 features in mktime64(): (1) Leap seconds. Leap seconds are indicated by the seconds parameter being the value 60. Handle this by treating it the same as 00 of the following minute. It has been pointed out that a minute may contain two leap seconds. However, pending discussion of what that looks like and how to handle it, I'm not going to concern myself with it. (2) Alternate encodings of midnight. Two different encodings of midnight are permitted - 00:00:00 and 24:00:00 - the first is midnight today and the second is midnight tomorrow and is exactly equivalent to the first with tomorrow's date. As it happens, we don't actually need to change mktime64() to handle either of these - just comment them as valid parameters. These facility will be used by the X.509 parser. Doing it in mktime64() makes the policy common to the whole kernel and easier to find. Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann cc: John Stultz cc: Rudolf Polzer cc: One Thousand Gnomes --- kernel/time/time.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/time/time.c b/kernel/time/time.c index 86751c68e08d..be115b020d27 100644 --- a/kernel/time/time.c +++ b/kernel/time/time.c @@ -322,6 +322,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(timespec_trunc); * -year/100+year/400 terms, and add 10.] * * This algorithm was first published by Gauss (I think). + * + * A leap second can be indicated by calling this function with sec as + * 60 (allowable under ISO 8601). The leap second is treated the same + * as the following second since they don't exist in UNIX time. + * + * An encoding of midnight at the end of the day as 24:00:00 - ie. midnight + * tomorrow - (allowable under ISO 8601) is supported. */ time64_t mktime64(const unsigned int year0, const unsigned int mon0, const unsigned int day, const unsigned int hour, @@ -338,7 +345,7 @@ time64_t mktime64(const unsigned int year0, const unsigned int mon0, return ((((time64_t) (year/4 - year/100 + year/400 + 367*mon/12 + day) + year*365 - 719499 - )*24 + hour /* now have hours */ + )*24 + hour /* now have hours - midnight tomorrow handled here */ )*60 + min /* now have minutes */ )*60 + sec; /* finally seconds */ } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 89053aa9c711bd455a68844b4ed37c8b72ef1daa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 10:36:07 +0000 Subject: MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy() linux/string.h should be #included in module_signing.c to get memcpy(), lest the following occur: kernel/module_signing.c: In function 'mod_verify_sig': kernel/module_signing.c:57:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'memcpy' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); ^ Reported-by: kbuild test robot Signed-off-by: David Howells --- kernel/module_signing.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 6528a79d998d..9cfa46d8d14f 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include "module-internal.h" -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4e8ae72a75aae285ec5b93518b9680da198afd0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 21:49:27 +0000 Subject: X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 14 +++++++------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 18 ++++++++---------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 8 +++----- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++-------------------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 ++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 17 ++++++++--------- include/crypto/public_key.h | 30 ++++-------------------------- kernel/module_signing.c | 6 ++++++ security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 2 +- 12 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c index adcef59eec0b..3242cbfaeaa2 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c @@ -86,25 +86,25 @@ int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); switch (oid) { case OID_md4: - ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4; + ctx->digest_algo = "md4"; break; case OID_md5: - ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; + ctx->digest_algo = "md5"; break; case OID_sha1: - ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + ctx->digest_algo = "sha1"; break; case OID_sha256: - ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256; + ctx->digest_algo = "sha256"; break; case OID_sha384: - ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384; + ctx->digest_algo = "sha384"; break; case OID_sha512: - ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512; + ctx->digest_algo = "sha512"; break; case OID_sha224: - ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224; + ctx->digest_algo = "sha224"; break; case OID__NR: diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index cbbd03fd94f8..40de03f49ff8 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -218,25 +218,25 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, switch (ctx->last_oid) { case OID_md4: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4; + ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "md4"; break; case OID_md5: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; + ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "md5"; break; case OID_sha1: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha1"; break; case OID_sha256: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256; + ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha256"; break; case OID_sha384: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384; + ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha384"; break; case OID_sha512: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512; + ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha512"; break; case OID_sha224: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224; + ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha224"; default: printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); return -ENOPKG; @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, switch (ctx->last_oid) { case OID_rsaEncryption: - ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; default: printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); @@ -615,8 +615,6 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, { struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; - BUG_ON(ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA); - ctx->sinfo->sig.s = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx->sinfo->sig.s) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index f5db1378c096..50be2a15e531 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -31,17 +31,15 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, void *digest; int ret; - kenter(",%u,%u", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo); + kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.hash_algo); - if (sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || - !hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) + if (!sinfo->sig.hash_algo) return -ENOPKG; /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how * big the hash operational data will be. */ - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo], - 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig.hash_algo, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 27ebc2f44394..0f8b264b3961 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -24,19 +24,6 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { - [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = "dsa", - [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "rsa", -}; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name); - -const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = { - [PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP", - [PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509", - [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] = "PKCS#7", -}; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name); - /* * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys. */ @@ -46,9 +33,7 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key, struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; if (key) - seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", - pkey_id_type_name[key->id_type], - pkey_algo_name[key->pkey_algo]); + seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", key->id_type, key->pkey_algo); } /* @@ -103,15 +88,14 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, BUG_ON(!sig->digest); BUG_ON(!sig->s); - alg_name = pkey_algo_name[sig->pkey_algo]; - if (sig->pkey_algo == PKEY_ALGO_RSA) { + alg_name = sig->pkey_algo; + if (strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) { /* The data wangled by the RSA algorithm is typically padded * and encoded in some manner, such as EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 * sec 8.2]. */ if (snprintf(alg_name_buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, - "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)", - hash_algo_name[sig->pkey_hash_algo] + "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)", sig->hash_algo ) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) return -EINVAL; alg_name = alg_name_buf; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index 897b734dabf9..7e8c2338ae25 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -328,12 +328,12 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, void *digest; int ret; - kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo); + kenter(",%s", ctx->digest_algo); /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how * big the hash operational data will be. */ - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->digest_algo, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h index 55d5f7ebc45a..a133eb81a492 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct pefile_context { /* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */ const void *digest; /* Digest */ unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */ - enum hash_algo digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */ + const char *digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */ }; #define kenter(FMT, ...) \ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index c02c200a7136..4a29bac70060 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -188,33 +188,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */ case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "md4"; + ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha1"; + ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha256"; + ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha384"; + ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha512"; + ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha224"; + ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; } @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption) return -ENOPKG; - ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa"; /* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */ ctx->key = value + 1; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index 7092d5cbb5d3..733c046aacc6 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how * big the hash operational data will be. */ - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(cert->sig.hash_algo, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) { cert->unsupported_crypto = true; @@ -291,21 +291,20 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); - if (cert->pub->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST || - cert->sig.pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST || - cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || - !hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) { + if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo || + !cert->sig.pkey_algo || + !cert->sig.hash_algo) { ret = -ENOPKG; goto error_free_cert; } - pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]); + pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo); pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to); pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", - pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo], - hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]); + cert->sig.pkey_algo, + cert->sig.hash_algo); - cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; + cert->pub->id_type = "X509"; /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) || diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h index 80ab099a3edf..aa730ea7faf8 100644 --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -14,28 +14,6 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H -#include - -enum pkey_algo { - PKEY_ALGO_DSA, - PKEY_ALGO_RSA, - PKEY_ALGO__LAST -}; - -extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST]; - -/* asymmetric key implementation supports only up to SHA224 */ -#define PKEY_HASH__LAST (HASH_ALGO_SHA224 + 1) - -enum pkey_id_type { - PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ - PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */ - PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */ - PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST -}; - -extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST]; - /* * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put. */ @@ -59,8 +37,8 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR]; struct public_key { void *key; u32 keylen; - enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; - enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; + const char *id_type; + const char *pkey_algo; }; extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload); @@ -73,8 +51,8 @@ struct public_key_signature { u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */ u8 *digest; u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ - enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; - enum hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; + const char *pkey_algo; + const char *hash_algo; }; extern struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype; diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 9cfa46d8d14f..64b9dead4a07 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ #include #include "module-internal.h" +enum pkey_id_type { + PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ + PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */ + PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */ +}; + /* * Module signature information block. * diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 69a92e6db23d..80052ed8d467 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, if (siglen != __be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size)) return -EBADMSG; - if (hdr->hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST) + if (hdr->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) return -ENOPKG; key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, __be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid)); @@ -103,8 +104,8 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks)); - pks.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; - pks.pkey_hash_algo = hdr->hash_algo; + pks.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + pks.hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo]; pks.digest = (u8 *)data; pks.digest_size = datalen; pks.s = hdr->sig; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 5efe2ecc538d..c7708d9a1b41 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ struct ima_digest_data { struct signature_v2_hdr { uint8_t type; /* xattr type */ uint8_t version; /* signature format version */ - uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */ + uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */ uint32_t keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */ uint16_t sig_size; /* signature size */ uint8_t sig[0]; /* signature payload */ -- cgit v1.2.3