From 6f2f724f0e116d9ea960ff3dd645add12e60e176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 10:32:11 -0700 Subject: lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index fc926d3cac6e..6e88faf3c6e5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -6601,8 +6601,19 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { - return security_sid_to_context(secid, - secdata, seclen); + return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); +} + +static int selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata, + u32 *seclen) +{ + u32 secid = prop->selinux.secid; + + /* scaffolding */ + if (!secid) + secid = prop->scaffold.secid; + + return selinux_secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) @@ -7347,6 +7358,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security), -- cgit v1.2.3 From f4602f163c98bc93c118e196466c1c98186adb67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 10:32:13 -0700 Subject: lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of the u32 secid. Change the name to security_ipc_getlsmprop() to reflect the change. Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/security.h | 18 +++++++++++++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +-- security/security.c | 14 +++++++------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 +++++++++------- 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index ed6ea0b1ec57..6ef2a345ea03 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userns_create, const struct cred *cred) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getsecid, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, - u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getlsmprop, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + struct lsm_prop *prop) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_msg_alloc_security, struct msg_msg *msg) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, msg_msg_free_security, struct msg_msg *msg) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_queue_alloc_security, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index c029bfe2c5bb..15aef5f68e77 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -289,6 +289,17 @@ static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id) return kernel_load_data_str[id]; } +/** + * lsmprop_init - initialize a lsm_prop structure + * @prop: Pointer to the data to initialize + * + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value. + */ +static inline void lsmprop_init(struct lsm_prop *prop) +{ + memset(prop, 0, sizeof(*prop)); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY /** @@ -515,7 +526,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred); int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_prop *prop); int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg); int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq); @@ -1377,9 +1388,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, return 0; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; + lsmprop_init(prop); } static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index d92326215f65..5019eb32a97f 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2638,8 +2638,7 @@ void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm = 0; - /* scaffolding */ - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oprop.scaffold.secid); + security_ipc_getlsmprop(ipcp, &context->ipc.oprop); context->type = AUDIT_IPC; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 1842f1325e77..f269421c2d72 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -3730,17 +3730,17 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) } /** - * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid + * security_ipc_getlsmprop() - Get the sysv ipc object LSM data * @ipcp: ipc permission structure - * @secid: secid pointer + * @prop: pointer to lsm information * - * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid - * will be set to zero. + * Get the lsm information associated with the ipc object. */ -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) + +void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); + lsmprop_init(prop); + call_void_hook(ipc_getlsmprop, ipcp, prop); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6e88faf3c6e5..1d43367009ed 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -6319,10 +6319,13 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } -static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp); - *secid = isec->sid; + prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = isec->sid; } static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) @@ -7215,7 +7218,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, selinux_ipc_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 66da7cbcc0b7..fed44b4fc73d 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3435,16 +3435,18 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag) } /** - * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id + * smack_ipc_getlsmprop - Extract smack security data * @ipp: the object permissions - * @secid: where result will be saved + * @prop: where result will be saved */ -static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid) +static void smack_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_prop *prop) { - struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp); - struct smack_known *iskp = *blob; + struct smack_known **iskpp = smack_ipc(ipp); + struct smack_known *iskp = *iskpp; - *secid = iskp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = iskp; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = iskp->smk_secid; } /** @@ -5140,7 +5142,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, smack_ipc_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 37f670aacd481128ad9a940ac2d3372aecd92824 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 10:32:15 -0700 Subject: lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible security data for possible reporting. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 6 ++-- include/linux/security.h | 13 ++++---- kernel/audit.c | 11 +++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++----- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 ++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++----------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++++----- security/security.c | 28 ++++++++--------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++---- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 25 +++++++++------ 16 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 6ef2a345ea03..8a90fd9ff3c8 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgroups, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getsecid_subj, u32 *secid) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj, - struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getlsmprop_subj, struct lsm_prop *prop) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getlsmprop_obj, + struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 15aef5f68e77..9bc8153f4e8b 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); -void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid); -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop); +void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1305,14 +1305,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return 0; } -static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static inline void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; + lsmprop_init(prop); } -static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; + lsmprop_init(prop); } static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 47c41e6f9ea9..d2797e8fe182 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2179,16 +2179,16 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) { + struct lsm_prop prop; char *ctx = NULL; unsigned len; int error; - u32 sid; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); - if (!sid) + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop)) return 0; - error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); + error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, &len); if (error) { if (error != -EINVAL) goto error_path; @@ -2405,8 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - /* scaffolding */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm.scaffold.secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_sig_lsm); } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 288a2092fd0d..a7de3dabe6e1 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1371,8 +1371,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_rule) { /* scaffolding */ - security_current_getsecid_subj( - &prop.scaffold.secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); result = security_audit_rule_match( &prop, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 5019eb32a97f..6b2b2a8d5647 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; - u32 sid; struct lsm_prop prop = { }; unsigned int sessionid; @@ -675,15 +674,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, * fork()/copy_process() in which case * the new @tsk creds are still a dup * of @current's creds so we can still - * use security_current_getsecid_subj() + * use + * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() * here even though it always refs * @current's creds */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); need_sid = 0; } - /* scaffolding */ - prop.scaffold.secid = sid; result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop, f->type, f->op, @@ -2730,12 +2728,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsm_prop prop; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop); + /* scaffolding */ + context->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid; memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2751,6 +2752,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); + struct lsm_prop prop; if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2762,7 +2764,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop); + /* scaffolding */ + ctx->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid; memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2783,7 +2787,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop); + /* scaffolding */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = prop.scaffold.secid; memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c index 9996883bf2b7..5925f48a3ade 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c @@ -1534,11 +1534,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) int ret_val; struct netlbl_dom_map *entry; struct netlbl_audit audit_info; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + /* scaffolding */ + audit_info.secid = prop.scaffold.secid; audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; audit_info.sessionid = 0; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h index d6c5b31eb4eb..39f4f6df5f51 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ */ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid); + struct lsm_prop prop; + + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + /* scaffolding */ + audit_info->secid = prop.scaffold.secid; audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index a58b72ed246c..6331bcb35ec0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -982,17 +982,24 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) return; } -static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - *secid = label->secid; + + prop->apparmor.label = label; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid; __end_current_label_crit_section(label); } -static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); - *secid = label->secid; + + prop->apparmor.label = label; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid; aa_put_label(label); } @@ -1503,8 +1510,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, + apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create), diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index cdfe8c8c7bac..c0d3b716d11f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); @@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 984e861f6e33..c35ea613c9f8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ err_out: * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @prop: properties of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ err_out: * */ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data, allowed_algos); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 656c709b974f..884a3533f7af 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 06132cf47016..553a6f54a1e2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file); struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid, + action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, &allowed_algos); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK || @@ -443,23 +443,23 @@ out: static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; int ret; if (!file) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) { - ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT); if (ret) return ret; } if (prot & PROT_EXEC) - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); return 0; @@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; struct inode *inode; + struct lsm_prop prop; int result = 0; int action; - u32 secid; int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ @@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, + current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, + current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); @@ -542,15 +542,18 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop = { }; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), + &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, + /* scaffolding */ + prop.scaffold.secid = secid; + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } @@ -566,10 +569,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -768,7 +771,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the @@ -788,9 +791,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_READ, func); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, + MAY_READ, func); } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { @@ -818,7 +821,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) @@ -831,8 +834,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -967,7 +970,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; int action = 0; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len) return -EINVAL; @@ -990,9 +993,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(), - secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, + &prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest) return -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 22a62e675ebc..a96dc3ff6aa0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated + * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, const char *func_data) { int i; @@ -658,8 +658,6 @@ retry: case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - /* scaffolding */ - prop.scaffold.secid = secid; rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); @@ -723,7 +721,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE) @@ -740,8 +738,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) { @@ -759,7 +757,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid, + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask, func_data)) continue; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f269421c2d72..5cdb5b171ff2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -3492,33 +3492,33 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) } /** - * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid - * @secid: secid value + * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() - Current task's subjective LSM data + * @prop: lsm specific information * * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return - * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * it in @prop. */ -void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); + lsmprop_init(prop); + call_void_hook(current_getlsmprop_subj, prop); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getlsmprop_subj); /** - * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid + * security_task_getlsmprop_obj() - Get a task's objective LSM data * @p: target task - * @secid: secid value + * @prop: lsm specific information * * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and - * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * return it in @prop. */ -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); + lsmprop_init(prop); + call_void_hook(task_getlsmprop_obj, p, prop); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getlsmprop_obj); /** * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1d43367009ed..7d6ffd3483a8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4169,14 +4169,19 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } -static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = current_sid(); + prop->selinux.secid = current_sid(); + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; } -static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = task_sid_obj(p); + prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p); + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) @@ -7203,8 +7208,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index fed44b4fc73d..e74e22c4232f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2239,30 +2239,35 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) } /** - * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task - * @secid: where to put the result + * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task + * @prop: where to put the result * * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label. */ -static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = skp; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; } /** - * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task + * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task * @p: the task - * @secid: where to put the result + * @prop: where to put the result * * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label. */ -static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = skp; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; } /** @@ -5130,8 +5135,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07f9d2c1132c9b838538b606dfcdab2506cd2ae4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 10:32:16 -0700 Subject: lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit. Change the name to security_inode_getlsmprop(). Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 +-- security/security.c | 11 +++++------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++------ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++----- 7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 8a90fd9ff3c8..23ad7e4f8c67 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -176,7 +176,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_setsecurity, struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listsecurity, struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_getsecid, struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_getlsmprop, struct inode *inode, + struct lsm_prop *prop) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_copy_up, struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_copy_up_xattr, struct dentry *src, const char *name) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 9bc8153f4e8b..2b19ef5d799c 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, void **buffer, bool alloc); int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); +void security_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop); int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name); int security_inode_setintegrity(const struct inode *inode, @@ -1076,9 +1076,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, return 0; } -static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; + lsmprop_init(prop); } static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 6b2b2a8d5647..372302f0528b 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2276,13 +2276,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) { + struct lsm_prop prop; + name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; name->mode = inode->i_mode; name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); + security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &prop); + /* scaffolding */ + name->osid = prop.scaffold.secid; if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) { name->fcap_ver = -1; return; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a96dc3ff6aa0..dbfd554b4624 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -649,8 +649,7 @@ retry: case LSM_OBJ_USER: case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: - /* scaffolding */ - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &prop.scaffold.secid); + security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &prop); rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5cdb5b171ff2..5e76e35dda09 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2724,16 +2724,15 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); /** - * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid + * security_inode_getlsmprop() - Get an inode's LSM data * @inode: inode - * @secid: secid to return + * @prop: lsm specific information to return * - * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be - * set to zero. + * Get the lsm specific information associated with the node. */ -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +void security_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop) { - call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); + call_void_hook(inode_getlsmprop, inode, prop); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7d6ffd3483a8..a9f8d10062b5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3503,15 +3503,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t return len; } -static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); - *secid = isec->sid; + + prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = isec->sid; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { - u32 sid; + struct lsm_prop prop; struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; @@ -3523,8 +3526,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ - selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid); - tsec->create_sid = sid; + selinux_inode_getlsmprop(d_inode(src), &prop); + tsec->create_sid = prop.selinux.secid; *new = new_creds; return 0; } @@ -7174,7 +7177,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, selinux_inode_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e74e22c4232f..5c3cb2837105 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1649,15 +1649,17 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, } /** - * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id + * smack_inode_getlsmprop - Extract inode's security id * @inode: inode to extract the info from - * @secid: where result will be saved + * @prop: where result will be saved */ -static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +static void smack_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = skp; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; } /* @@ -5110,7 +5112,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, smack_inode_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl), -- cgit v1.2.3 From b0654ca42998440df42ba2ccc3b7dbe3bf5b7bb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 10:32:18 -0700 Subject: lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook Create a new LSM hook security_cred_getlsmprop() which, like security_cred_getsecid(), fetches LSM specific attributes from the cred structure. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsm_prop to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++----- security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 23ad7e4f8c67..eb2937599cb0 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_prepare, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_transfer, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getsecid, const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getlsmprop, const struct cred *c, + struct lsm_prop *prop) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 2b19ef5d799c..acd2e5d1b0ff 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); +void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); @@ -1229,6 +1230,10 @@ static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) *secid = 0; } +static inline void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, + struct lsm_prop *prop) +{ } + static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 553a6f54a1e2..91154bb05900 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -541,8 +541,7 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; - u32 secid; - struct lsm_prop prop = { }; + struct lsm_prop prop; security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), @@ -550,9 +549,7 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (ret) return ret; - security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); - /* scaffolding */ - prop.scaffold.secid = secid; + security_cred_getlsmprop(bprm->cred, &prop); return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5e76e35dda09..0003d5ace5cc 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -3272,6 +3272,21 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); +/** + * security_cred_getlsmprop() - Get the LSM data from a set of credentials + * @c: credentials + * @prop: destination for the LSM data + * + * Retrieve the security data of the cred structure @c. In case of + * failure, @prop will be cleared. + */ +void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop) +{ + lsmprop_init(prop); + call_void_hook(cred_getlsmprop, c, prop); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getlsmprop); + /** * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid * @new: credentials diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a9f8d10062b5..438dfa17faae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4037,6 +4037,13 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) *secid = cred_sid(c); } +static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop) +{ + prop->selinux.secid = cred_sid(c); + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; +} + /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled @@ -7203,6 +7210,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, selinux_cred_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 5c3cb2837105..52cc6a65d674 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2150,6 +2150,23 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid) rcu_read_unlock(); } +/** + * smack_cred_getlsmprop - get the Smack label for a creds structure + * @cred: the object creds + * @prop: where to put the data + * + * Sets the Smack part of the ref + */ +static void smack_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *cred, + struct lsm_prop *prop) +{ + rcu_read_lock(); + prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred)); + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = prop->smack.skp->smk_secid; + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + /** * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. @@ -5132,6 +5149,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, smack_cred_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8afd8c8faa24249e48f5007aee46209299377588 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 10:32:21 -0700 Subject: lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding Remove the scaffold member from the lsm_prop. Remove the remaining places it is being set. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/security.h | 6 ------ security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +----- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ---- security/apparmor/secid.c | 6 +----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 +----------------- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 ---- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++----------------------------- 7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index acd2e5d1b0ff..fd690fa73162 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -156,11 +156,6 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; -/* scaffolding */ -struct lsm_prop_scaffold { - u32 secid; -}; - /* * Data exported by the security modules */ @@ -169,7 +164,6 @@ struct lsm_prop { struct lsm_prop_smack smack; struct lsm_prop_apparmor apparmor; struct lsm_prop_bpf bpf; - struct lsm_prop_scaffold scaffold; }; extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1]; diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 87df6fa2a48d..73087d76f649 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -270,11 +270,7 @@ int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule) struct aa_label *label; int found = 0; - /* scaffolding */ - if (!prop->apparmor.label && prop->scaffold.secid) - label = aa_secid_to_label(prop->scaffold.secid); - else - label = prop->apparmor.label; + label = prop->apparmor.label; if (!label) return -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 6331bcb35ec0..1edc12862a7d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -987,8 +987,6 @@ static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); prop->apparmor.label = label; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid; __end_current_label_crit_section(label); } @@ -998,8 +996,6 @@ static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); prop->apparmor.label = label; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid; aa_put_label(label); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c index 34610888559f..6350d107013a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/secid.c +++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c @@ -102,11 +102,7 @@ int apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata, { struct aa_label *label; - /* scaffolding */ - if (!prop->apparmor.label && prop->scaffold.secid) - label = aa_secid_to_label(prop->scaffold.secid); - else - label = prop->apparmor.label; + label = prop->apparmor.label; return apparmor_label_to_secctx(label, secdata, seclen); } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 438dfa17faae..025b60c5b605 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3508,8 +3508,6 @@ static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop) struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = isec->sid; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) @@ -4040,8 +4038,6 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop) { prop->selinux.secid = cred_sid(c); - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; } /* @@ -4182,16 +4178,12 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { prop->selinux.secid = current_sid(); - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; } static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop) { prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p); - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) @@ -6339,8 +6331,6 @@ static void selinux_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, { struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp); prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = isec->sid; } static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) @@ -6625,13 +6615,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) static int selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { - u32 secid = prop->selinux.secid; - - /* scaffolding */ - if (!secid) - secid = prop->scaffold.secid; - - return selinux_secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); + return selinux_secid_to_secctx(prop->selinux.secid, secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e0c14773a7b7..07ba5b3643dd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3661,10 +3661,6 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vru goto out; } - /* scaffolding */ - if (!prop->selinux.secid && prop->scaffold.secid) - prop->selinux.secid = prop->scaffold.secid; - ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, prop->selinux.secid); if (unlikely(!ctxt)) { WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 52cc6a65d674..0c476282e279 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1655,11 +1655,7 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, */ static void smack_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode); - - prop->smack.skp = skp; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = smk_of_inode(inode); } /* @@ -2162,8 +2158,6 @@ static void smack_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *cred, { rcu_read_lock(); prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred)); - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = prop->smack.skp->smk_secid; rcu_read_unlock(); } @@ -2265,11 +2259,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) */ static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - - prop->smack.skp = skp; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = smk_of_current(); } /** @@ -2282,11 +2272,7 @@ static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); - - prop->smack.skp = skp; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); } /** @@ -3466,11 +3452,8 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag) static void smack_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct smack_known **iskpp = smack_ipc(ipp); - struct smack_known *iskp = *iskpp; - prop->smack.skp = iskp; - /* scaffolding */ - prop->scaffold.secid = iskp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = *iskpp; } /** @@ -4805,10 +4788,6 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER) return 0; - /* scaffolding */ - if (!skp && prop->scaffold.secid) - skp = smack_from_secid(prop->scaffold.secid); - /* * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs, * both pointers will point to the same smack_known @@ -4869,10 +4848,6 @@ static int smack_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata, { struct smack_known *skp = prop->smack.skp; - /* scaffolding */ - if (!skp && prop->scaffold.secid) - skp = smack_from_secid(prop->scaffold.secid); - if (secdata) *secdata = skp->smk_known; *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known); -- cgit v1.2.3