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authorJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>2024-04-12 09:45:28 +0200
committerJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>2024-04-19 12:38:37 +0200
commit93a88f42db7ed9a975768df0e5f4516317c50dda (patch)
tree425bd4d9bc74c6a172a6d29e28c468158f094a96 /fsck.c
parentrepository: avoid leaking `fsmonitor` data (diff)
parentGit 2.39.4 (diff)
downloadgit-93a88f42db7ed9a975768df0e5f4516317c50dda.tar.gz
git-93a88f42db7ed9a975768df0e5f4516317c50dda.zip
Sync with 2.39.4
* maint-2.39: (38 commits) Git 2.39.4 fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone Add a helper function to compare file contents init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter entry: report more colliding paths t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/' docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories ...
Diffstat (limited to 'fsck.c')
-rw-r--r--fsck.c56
1 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fsck.c b/fsck.c
index 2b18717ee8..3ba690bda8 100644
--- a/fsck.c
+++ b/fsck.c
@@ -636,6 +636,8 @@ static int fsck_tree(const struct object_id *tree_oid,
retval += report(options, tree_oid, OBJ_TREE,
FSCK_MSG_MAILMAP_SYMLINK,
".mailmap is a symlink");
+ oidset_insert(&options->symlink_targets_found,
+ entry_oid);
}
if ((backslash = strchr(name, '\\'))) {
@@ -1269,6 +1271,56 @@ static int fsck_blob(const struct object_id *oid, const char *buf,
}
}
+ if (oidset_contains(&options->symlink_targets_found, oid)) {
+ const char *ptr = buf;
+ const struct object_id *reported = NULL;
+
+ oidset_insert(&options->symlink_targets_done, oid);
+
+ if (!buf || size > PATH_MAX) {
+ /*
+ * A missing buffer here is a sign that the caller found the
+ * blob too gigantic to load into memory. Let's just consider
+ * that an error.
+ */
+ return report(options, oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+ FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_TARGET_LENGTH,
+ "symlink target too long");
+ }
+
+ while (!reported && ptr) {
+ const char *p = ptr;
+ char c, *slash = strchrnul(ptr, '/');
+ char *backslash = memchr(ptr, '\\', slash - ptr);
+
+ c = *slash;
+ *slash = '\0';
+
+ while (!reported && backslash) {
+ *backslash = '\0';
+ if (is_ntfs_dotgit(p))
+ ret |= report(options, reported = oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+ FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_POINTS_TO_GIT_DIR,
+ "symlink target points to git dir");
+ *backslash = '\\';
+ p = backslash + 1;
+ backslash = memchr(p, '\\', slash - p);
+ }
+ if (!reported && is_ntfs_dotgit(p))
+ ret |= report(options, reported = oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+ FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_POINTS_TO_GIT_DIR,
+ "symlink target points to git dir");
+
+ if (!reported && is_hfs_dotgit(ptr))
+ ret |= report(options, reported = oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+ FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_POINTS_TO_GIT_DIR,
+ "symlink target points to git dir");
+
+ *slash = c;
+ ptr = c ? slash + 1 : NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
return ret;
}
@@ -1367,6 +1419,10 @@ int fsck_finish(struct fsck_options *options)
FSCK_MSG_GITATTRIBUTES_MISSING, FSCK_MSG_GITATTRIBUTES_BLOB,
options, ".gitattributes");
+ ret |= fsck_blobs(&options->symlink_targets_found, &options->symlink_targets_done,
+ FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_TARGET_MISSING, FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_TARGET_BLOB,
+ options, "<symlink-target>");
+
return ret;
}