diff options
| author | Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> | 2025-07-29 15:54:46 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2025-08-27 04:35:01 -0400 |
| commit | b7d97f69edd488b9755ba2858fe7f33e24566500 (patch) | |
| tree | 815cae2f3ceb6340b673466750e95ec4ca59c057 /arch/x86/kvm/svm | |
| parent | KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages (diff) | |
| download | linux-b7d97f69edd488b9755ba2858fe7f33e24566500.tar.gz linux-b7d97f69edd488b9755ba2858fe7f33e24566500.zip | |
KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd for all mappings,
not just private mappings, so that hugepage support plays nice with the
upcoming support for backing non-private memory with guest_memfd.
In addition to getting the max order from guest_memfd for gmem-only
memslots, update TDX's hook to effectively ignore shared mappings, as TDX's
restrictions on page size only apply to Secure EPT mappings. Do nothing
for SNP, as RMP restrictions apply to both private and shared memory.
Suggested-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-16-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/svm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 |
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index b926a053b8cf..5bac4d20aec0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -4943,7 +4943,7 @@ next_pfn: } } -int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private) { int level, rc; bool assigned; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index d84a83ae18a1..70df7c6413cf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code); void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order); void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end); -int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private); struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa); #else @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, in return 0; } static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) {} -static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) +static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private) { return 0; } |