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authorAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2021-09-26 13:07:28 -0700
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2021-09-26 13:07:28 -0700
commite7d5184b24fb131b6ffc77cf84cd2d7d0d814b68 (patch)
treedbea750e919a475e18b051f991552847ec0b65ff /kernel
parent091037fb770e1771a52246f9b68dc76082178a3c (diff)
parentef979017b837031cbe3f2f7a4d78b00c48dc770b (diff)
downloadlinux-e7d5184b24fb131b6ffc77cf84cd2d7d0d814b68.tar.gz
linux-e7d5184b24fb131b6ffc77cf84cd2d7d0d814b68.zip
Merge branch 'bpf: Support <8-byte scalar spill and refill'
Martin KaFai says: ==================== The verifier currently does not save the reg state when spilling <8byte bounded scalar to the stack. The bpf program will be incorrectly rejected when this scalar is refilled to the reg and then used to offset into a packet header. The later patch has a simplified bpf prog from a real use case to demonstrate this case. The current work around is to reparse the packet again such that this offset scalar is close to where the packet data will be accessed to avoid the spill. Thus, the header is parsed twice. The llvm patch [1] will align the <8bytes spill to the 8-byte stack address. This set is to make the necessary changes in verifier to support <8byte scalar spill and refill. [1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D109073 v2: - Changed the xdpwall selftest in patch 3 to trigger a u32 spill at a non 8-byte aligned stack address. The v1 has simplified the real example too much such that it only triggers a u32 spill but does not spill at a non 8-byte aligned stack address. - Changed README.rst in patch 3 to explain the llvm dependency for the xdpwall test. ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c97
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index e76b55917905..7a8351604f67 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -612,6 +612,20 @@ static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id)
return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off);
}
+/* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when
+ * it was spilled to the stack.
+ */
+static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
+{
+ return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL;
+}
+
+static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype)
+{
+ if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
+ *stype = STACK_MISC;
+}
+
static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_func_state *state)
{
@@ -717,7 +731,7 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
continue;
verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live);
- if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
+ if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) {
reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
t = reg->type;
verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]);
@@ -2373,7 +2387,7 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
reg->precise = true;
}
for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
- if (func->stack[j].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
+ if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
continue;
reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
@@ -2415,7 +2429,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
}
while (spi >= 0) {
- if (func->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) {
+ if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[spi])) {
stack_mask = 0;
break;
}
@@ -2514,7 +2528,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
return 0;
}
- if (func->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) {
+ if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[i])) {
stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i);
continue;
}
@@ -2626,15 +2640,21 @@ static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
}
static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
- int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+ int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int size)
{
int i;
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg;
- state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
+ state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+
+ for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--)
+ state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL;
- for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
- state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
+ /* size < 8 bytes spill */
+ for (; i; i--)
+ scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]);
}
/* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
@@ -2681,7 +2701,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true;
}
- if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_bounded(reg) &&
+ if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) &&
!register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) {
if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
/* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
@@ -2694,7 +2714,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (err)
return err;
}
- save_register_state(state, spi, reg);
+ save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
} else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {
/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
@@ -2706,16 +2726,16 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
- save_register_state(state, spi, reg);
+ save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
} else {
u8 type = STACK_MISC;
/* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
/* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */
- if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL)
+ if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]))
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
- state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC;
+ scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]);
/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
* otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
@@ -2918,23 +2938,50 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
- u8 *stype;
+ u8 *stype, type;
stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
reg = &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
- if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
+ if (is_spilled_reg(&reg_state->stack[spi])) {
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
+ u8 scalar_size = 0;
+
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- if (dst_regno >= 0) {
+
+ mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
+ if (dst_regno < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--)
+ scalar_size++;
+
+ if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == scalar_size) {
+ /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the
+ * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first.
+ */
+ s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def;
+
+ state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
+ state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+ if (type == STACK_SPILL)
+ continue;
+ if (type == STACK_MISC)
+ continue;
+ verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+ off, i, size);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
- state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
}
- mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
+ state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
return 0;
}
for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
@@ -2965,8 +3012,6 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
} else {
- u8 type;
-
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (type == STACK_MISC)
@@ -4514,17 +4559,17 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
goto mark;
}
- if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
+ if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
goto mark;
- if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
+ if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
if (clobber) {
__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
- state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC;
+ scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]);
}
goto mark;
}
@@ -10356,9 +10401,9 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
- if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
+ if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1)
continue;
- if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
+ if (!is_spilled_reg(&old->stack[spi]))
continue;
if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
&cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap))
@@ -10565,7 +10610,7 @@ static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
- if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
+ if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i]))
continue;
state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||