summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
AgeCommit message (Expand)AuthorLines
2022-08-18x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta-2/+12
2022-08-13Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2022-08-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kerne...Linus Torvalds-4/+6
2022-08-08x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RETBleedKim Phillips-4/+6
2022-08-03x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protectionsDaniel Sneddon-23/+63
2022-07-29x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB at firmware entry when IBPB is not availableThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo-0/+1
2022-07-20x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS partsPawan Gupta-0/+3
2022-07-18x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware callsPeter Zijlstra-1/+10
2022-07-16x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typoKim Phillips-1/+1
2022-07-14x86/bugs: Mark retbleed_strings staticJiapeng Chong-1/+1
2022-07-09x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behaviorPawan Gupta-0/+26
2022-07-08x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supportedThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo-2/+5
2022-06-29x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobsPeter Zijlstra-15/+27
2022-06-27KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenterJosh Poimboeuf-2/+2
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRSJosh Poimboeuf-5/+58
2022-06-27KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRSJosh Poimboeuf-0/+4
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_maskJosh Poimboeuf-30/+1
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exitJosh Poimboeuf-11/+1
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state changeJosh Poimboeuf-1/+2
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only onceJosh Poimboeuf-10/+5
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpbPeter Zijlstra-9/+34
2022-06-27intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idlePeter Zijlstra-0/+6
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerabilityPeter Zijlstra-6/+33
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mit...Peter Zijlstra-8/+17
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRSPawan Gupta-14/+52
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writesPeter Zijlstra-6/+12
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL valuePeter Zijlstra-5/+23
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RETKim Phillips-12/+46
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameterAlexandre Chartre-1/+107
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerabilityAlexandre Chartre-0/+13
2022-06-14Merge tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/...Linus Torvalds-36/+199
2022-06-01x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warningJosh Poimboeuf-0/+11
2022-05-21x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selectionPawan Gupta-3/+5
2022-05-21x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta-0/+22
2022-05-21x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idlePawan Gupta-2/+14
2022-05-21x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigationsPawan Gupta-10/+16
2022-05-21x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta-4/+107
2022-05-21x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation updatePawan Gupta-26/+33
2022-04-05x86/speculation/srbds: Do not try to turn mitigation off when not supportedRicardo CaƱuelo-0/+7
2022-03-05x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMTJosh Poimboeuf-2/+25
2022-03-05x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigationJosh Poimboeuf-0/+5
2022-02-28x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMDKim Phillips-9/+0
2022-02-21x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation re...Josh Poimboeuf-6/+29
2022-02-21x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline optionsPeter Zijlstra-37/+96
2022-02-21x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCEPeter Zijlstra (Intel)-11/+18
2021-11-01Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/gi...Linus Torvalds-2/+2
2021-11-01Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g...Linus Torvalds-1/+1
2021-10-28x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amdPeter Zijlstra-7/+0
2021-10-20x86/fpu: Replace the includes of fpu/internal.hThomas Gleixner-1/+1
2021-10-04x86: change default to spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl spectre_v2_user=prctlAndrea Arcangeli-2/+2
2021-07-28x86, prctl: Hook L1D flushing in via prctlBalbir Singh-0/+33